Last time we talked tanks…

This time we’ll focus on Russia’s winter offensive. If you don’t have time, just skip to the takeaways at the bottom of this post.

credit Institute for the Study of War; I highly recommend ISW’s briefings

Quick take – the offensive isn’t going well. While Russia is making advances, they are measured in meters not miles, and are coming at horrendous cost in dead, injured, and captured Russian troops. The Russians did capture Soledar and have make barely measurable progress around Bakhmut and a couple other places but none of those are – in any way – changing the reality on the ground.

Which is Russia is screwed.

As we discussed in WOT #10, you need troops and equipment to fight a war.

The Russians lost a huge amount of equipment last year – hundreds of tanks, armored fighting vehicles, cannons, trucks, trains – equipment it cannot readily replace, if at all. If you want to attack, as Russia is trying to do in its winter offensive, you really need armored vehicles to penetrate opponents’ lines and break out into less well-defended territory. Dug-in defenses  – usually several lines deep – are very, very hard to defeat unless you can blow a really big hole in them and exploit the opening with fast-moving vehicles.

So, in what is eerily reminiscent of World War One, Putin the Butcher is throwing thousands of untrained men at Ukraine’s front lines. (If you want a taste of that, I highly recommend the book and film “All Quiet on the Western Front“.) Trigger alert – it is really awful and disturbing, and the German general is a bald version of Putin the Butcher.

PtB’s tactics are pretty awful…

• untrained ex-prisoners and recruits from Russia’s far east are forced to attack Ukrainians positions.
• they are slaughtered – because they have no idea what they are doing, have minimal weapons and ammunition, and are going up against entrenched, battle-hardened and well-supplied Ukrainians, but
• in so doing, the Ukrainians reveal their positions, which are then bombarded with rockets and artillery and attacked by much more capable Russian troops.

That is NOT to say Russia’s “real” soldiers are invulnerable. Reports from the front indicate Putin’s “elite” units lost dozens of armored vehicles and hundreds of soldiers over the last few days…equipment and men which Russia cannot afford to lose.

Putin the Butcher has a seemingly inexhaustible supply of poor young men but they are a very poor substitute for modern military vehicles and artillery.

Takeaways

While others much more knowledgeable than I see this war grinding on for years, I’m hard pressed to agree.

Russia:

• cannot replace most lost equipment,
• is losing more and more of its irreplaceable, experienced and well-trained troops,
• has not demonstrated its generals have any idea what to do,
• is facing an increasingly better-equipped and far more motivated enemy, and
• is losing the information and intel dimensions.

Like we saw late last spring, all is well until it is not, and then it goes really, really badly for Putin the Butcher.

all previous posts on this topic are here.

Far too many work comp industry CEOs are dinosaurs.

Their refusal to adapt to today’s labor market will ensure they fail their investors/policyholders.

Two things triggered this post.

1. an extensive conversation – or rather series of conversations – with the CEO of a very large payer whose workers are no longer required to work in office. When I asked about work from home, this eminently reasonable individual was mildly surprised, saying something like “of course we support WFH…there’s no reason for most of our folks to go to an office…they did just fine during COVID and like WFH so why change?” This person noted real estate and related costs would be reduced as would other expenses associated with an office-based work environment.
2. A conversation with the estimable Bill Zachry, a person I am fortunate indeed to consider a good friend and mentor. Bill noted the challenges payers are experiencing finding and keeping adjusters.

It seems wildly obvious that WFH will help payers keep and find staff while lowering overall costs, significantly reducing ULAE (unallocated loss adjustment expense). Every payer C-suite has been on a cost-cutting rampage for several years in an effort to improve margins and adapt to declining frequency and shrinking rates.

In what can only be described as a logical fallacy, many payers are now “requiring” staff return to the office for more than an occasional day.

Good luck with that.

Most people do NOT have to work in an office, yet many CEOs refuse to accept that they – the Tyrannosaur Rexes of our time – cannot bend lesser beings to their will.

Sure, many workers are already back in the office, and some few prefer it. But most would much prefer not:

• having to deal with child care emergencies by taking PTO;
• commuting;
• dealing with office politics;
• wasting time at birthday parties, Monday morning “how was your weekend” chats, water cooler analyses of whatever sporting event, updates on officemates’ kids amazing (insert school/sports/music/theater/other), or the millions of other time wasters engrained in office-based work.

Shockingly, workers would much prefer to spend the 2 hours or so a day commuting with their family, or doing work, or exercising, or gardening or whatever.

And they’d rather save big bucks by ditching a car and its attendant insurance, license, tax, toll and maintenance costs; giving up the monthly commuting pass; not paying to park; having lunch at home and on and on.

To be sure there are arguments, some of them even reasonable, in favor of in-office work…yet the fact that most every organization survived COVID WFH is a rather compelling proof statement that WFH works.

What does this mean for you?

Mesozoic-era management will fail as will its proponents and the organizations they lead.

Last time we talked about weapons…how many each side had, what’s been lost, and the challenges in replacing those weapons.

Today’s newsfeed arrived with the VERY welcome news that Germany has OK’ed supplying Leopard 2 tanks, and we will be sending Abrams tanks to Ukraine. The UK had committed to send 14 of its Challenger II tanks to Ukraine… Note that countries that use Leopard 2s have to get permission from Germany before sending them to Ukraine; with this latest announcement sources indicate Ukraine will get at least 100 Leopard 2s.

This will supply roughly one brigade – and is about 1/3 of what Ukraines’ leaders say they need.

These are “main battle tanks” [MBTs], a term describing very heavy, very well armored vehicles with very powerful cannons. Unlike the other armored vehicles already sent to or on the way to Ukraine, MBTs are much more likely to survive an IED, land mine, rocket or artillery attack.

Highlights…

• Leopard 2 tanks are very capable; well armored and with a very powerful cannon, highly mobile, durable and simpler to maintain than the US Abrams tank
• there are thousands of them in more than 19 armies

  

• The US Abrams is equally if not more capable, BUT…
  • guzzles fuel (although it can use jet fuel, gasoline, or diesel)
  • requires a lot more maintenance
  • is really heavy and thus harder to transport

Timing

These will not be there tomorrow…however I’d bet NATO countries will be sending tanks from their current units rather than pulling mothballed older versions and going through what could be a long and difficult process of upgrading them and preparing them for battle.

Then there’s spare parts, fuel, ammunition, training, repair and maintenance  personnel and facilities and transport. These are massive, very complex vehicles that require a lot of care and feeding.

Experts contend that Ukraine’s Army has shown itself quite able to learn complicated weapons systems quickly; it’s use of the HIMARS rocket system, artillery, and anti-ship missiles has been pretty impressive.

What does this mean?

This is a major move, one that will definitely improve Ukraine’s chances of retaking territory. 

That said, like any tool, it comes down to how well it is used.