Aug
8

Hospitals’ growing power

We’re going to stick with the hospital story for just a bit longer. So far posts have discussed the significant profits generated by workers comp payments, the inability of comp networks to manage facility costs, and a cornucopia of other hospital-related issues.
The thesis statement for all could be summed up thusly – Hospitals are gaining power at the expense of commercial payers.
Here’s the proof.
The largest hospital/surgery center company in the nation, HCA reported a 21.6% jump in profits in the last quarter. Revenues “increased 3.7 percent to nearly $7 billion despite a decline in surgeries and flat admission numbers. ”
Lets parse that statement out.
Profits were up much more than revenues, indicating the company (also known as Hospital Corp of America) has been able to keep expenses under control while delivering higher margin services.
Revenues were up even though surgeries (which tend to be very profitable) were down (albeit slightly at 0.5% for inpatient and 0.7% for outpatient facilities) and admissions were flat. The only way that can happen is by changing the mix of services delivered and improving the payer mix (think private insurance instead of Medicaid).
HCA’s success wasn’t an anomaly. Unlike the other hospital companies, Universal Health Services (could we please get just a bit creative with the company names here?) enjoyed an increase in profits and revenue. UHS saw its profits increase 35%, driven by a big increase in inpatient admissions (up 8.5%) and smaller, yet significant increase in the length of hospital stays (up 3.1%). This wasn’t just a one-quarter event; looking at the first half of the year, revenues were up 8% and net income rose 34%. Note that UHS is one of the smaller for-profit hospital companies with fewer than 31 hospitals.
Revenues and profits were also up at HMA, with top line increasing 3.9% despite a decline in patient volumes. HMA, which operates 58 hospitals, also had a good first half of the year with profits almost doubling on a 4% increase in revenue. Interestingly, surgery counts also declined slightly at HMA over the same quarter in the prior year.
We’ll round out the review with a quick look at Tenet – the 58 hospital company saw admissions up almost 2%, driven mostly by ‘governmental managed care admissions’ which jumped 16%. (I wonder, does that mean the Medicaid and Medicare Advantage programs are seeing higher inpatient admission rates? or is it just a shift from unmanaged Medicare?) Tenet also enjoyed a 7.5% increase in ‘same hospital commercial managed care revenues’. (which brings up the rather uncomfortable question – is Tenet a preferred partner with the big managed care companies, or are the big managed care companies seeing a jump in hospital admits?)
Notably, Tenet’s revenues were up 6.3% on that 1.9% increase in admits, a rather surprising jump given that the Feds are not exactly a generous payer. And digging deeper into Tenet’s earnings report, one learns that commercial insurer admits actually declined 2.2% and patient days dropped 3.1%, while outpatient visits were also down 1.8%. So, revenues were up 7.5% on fewer admits and shorter stays…Cost-shifting, perhaps?
Here are a couple statements from Tenet’s earnings report that shed additional light on the situation.

  • Outpatient pricing outpaced the growth in inpatient pricing due to an improving mix of procedures performed in our outpatient facilities.
  • Pricing improvement was evident across all key metrics, primarily reflecting the improved terms of our commercial managed care contracts [emphasis added]

And this from Forbes “Price increases from better terms in its commercial managed-care contracts also helped boost Tenet’s profit and revenue.”
Looks like a trend to me – hospital revenues are up slightly, profits are up much more than revenues, and this despite (mostly) flat patient volumes and lower surgical volumes.
The source of all these profits? Commercial managed care companies.
Which brings us back to a question I asked a while ago; “what exactly are ‘managed care’ companies managing?”
Thanks to FierceHealthcare for the heads up


Aug
6

Comp networks and hospital costs

A few weeks ago I wrote about the big profits hospitals get from workers comp, and closed with the observation that comp payers are overpaying hospitals. The question is why?
Glad you asked.
Since OUCH (predecessor organization to First Health, now Coventry) first started the work comp network business in a major way (although AIG’s managed care sub had one in the DC area in the mid-eighties, OUCH’s entry really got things going in the late eighties) the business has exploded, with pretty much every work comp payer using a PPO nowadays. The idea is payers get to reduce their expenses and only pay the PPO for ‘savings’.
So, are networks actually saving medical dollars?
Lets run the numbers. National PPO penetration averages around 58-62%, with wide variations among the states (NJ and FL are up above 90% with NY down below 45%). Savings (below FS or U&C but not net of PPO fees) runs about 10-12%, and PPOs charge from 16-23% to their ‘retail’ customers.
Total work comp medical spend this year will be about $32 billion. PPOs are ‘saving’ about $2.4 billion and getting paid about $480 million for that service.
But medical costs in comp are still going up faster than group health medical inflation, and considerably faster than the medical CPI. The biggest contributor to that inflation is facility costs.
According to the latest stats from NCCI, comp medical trend was 6.0% in 2007, 8.6% in 2006, and 6.2% in 2004. By way of comparison, the CPI was 4.4% in ’07, 4% in ’06, and 4.4% in ’05. Anecdotal information from several payers indicates trend is heading up in 2008, with facility costs particularly problematic. And that anecdotal information is backed up by national figures, which indicate facility costs are the fastest growing component of the medical CPI at an annual rate of 4.8%.
In contrast, drugs and supplies were up 0.1 percent in June after dropping 0.7 percent in May. Professional services increased 0.3 percent in June after a 0.7 percent increase in May.
Facility costs in workers comp make up between 35% to 55% of total medical expense (depending on the state) – a pretty significant chunk. As they continue to rise faster than other sectors, that ‘share’ will also rise, making facility costs increasingly significant.
Why aren’t networks able to deliver better results for facilities? Market share. Workers comp makes up less than 2% of total medical costs in the US. When a workers comp network calls on a hospital, the red carpet isn’t exactly rolled out – the managed care contracting department is pretty uninterested in offering a deal to a network that might deliver one percent of their total revenue. While workers comp can be very profitable for hospitals, most facilities look at the revenue numbers and set priorities accordingly.
This isn’t going to change – work comp network deals (with a few minor exceptions) are specific to workers comp. A PPO owned by a group health company may try to leverage the group business when negotiating with a hospital, but get real – the group contract is way more important to the insurer/network than work comp, so when push comes to shove during the contract negotiation process, work comp discounts will be given up to get a better group health discount.
Although there is consolidation going on as one would expect in what is a mature market, there is little in the way of innovation among the larger generalist network vendors. Even though their results are declining, the big PPOs have nothing to gain from innovation, and a half-billion dollars to lose.
What does this mean for you?
Until payers decide they are sick of being pushed around by networks producing increasingly crappy results, this isn’t going to change.


Jul
25

Coventry earnings call – the analysts blew it

I think I’ve figured out why analysts have been unable to accurately forecast health plan financials – they don’t know what questions to ask.
That’s the only conclusion I can draw after listening to the latest earnings call from Coventry Health. The mid-tier health plan company is still reeling a bit from last month’s announcement that it had been surprised by a sharp increase in medical costs, an increase that evidently had caught management by surprise.
Folks, this is a health plan company – one that claims “We deliver exceptional value every day, driving solutions that help people enjoy optimal health.”
One might think that a health plan company makes money by managing medical care for hundreds of thousands of Americans. Near as I can tell, Coventry isn’t a health plan, it is a transaction processor that makes money by pricing its insurance far enough above medical costs to administer the plans and make a bit of margin.
And from the questions that were asked ,and the ones that weren’t, it is pretty obvious Wall Street analysts think Coventry is a transaction processor as well. Out of the twenty or so questions after the management presentation, there was one – yes, one, that got anywhere close to actually inquiring about medical management. That questioner asked what Coventry could do or had done to deliver care to Medicare enrollees through an HMO at lower cost than thru the standard Medicare plan. Coventry Chairman Dale Wolf responded by noting that hospital days per 1000 members among Medicare HMO plans could be in teh 900-1300 range, compared to standard Medicare rates of around 3000 days/1000.
That was it. No follow up question as to how they could do that, what the long term implications were, how that affected pricing, what the techniques were that delivered such a great result and could those techniques be used for commercial members.
The entire conversation was about medical trend and how Coventry was fixing its pricing model to reflect higher trend, and if enrollment was going to decrease as a result. Not the factors causing medical trend and what Coventry was doing about it. Well, to be fair, there was a little dialogue about higher inpatient utilization and unit costs in Medicare, and higher hospital utilization on the commercial side. But if you were interested in Coventry’s solution to same, you’re out of luck. Not one analyst even asked.
If analysts don’t know to ask the company why their costs are going up and what they are going to do about it and how that will play out, what, exactly, are they ‘analyzing’?
There’s this thing in business called a sustainable competitive advantage – something you do really well, that is hard to do, that others don’t do well. This gives you an edge in the market, one that makes you a perennial winner. Coventry doesn’t have one, and neither do any of the other health plans. Because all they do is process transactions, adding no value.
Here are some of the questions they should have been asking.

  • What key indicators of medical trend do you watch closely?
  • Exactly what is your average inpatient days per thousand for each block of business and how does that compare to industry standards?
  • How about admissions per thousand?
  • what is driving trend? Is it unit cost (price per service), utilization (number of those services received by a member when they do get those services), frequency (percentage of members that get that service) or intensity (higher cost version of a technology or more expensive procedure type than expected)?
  • Which types of medical care are the biggest drivers; ancillary, physician services, pharma, inpatient, outpatient?
  • What is your plan to address those issues?
  • How will you measure results and when will you know if you’ve been effective?
  • What is Coventry doing about members with chronic conditions? How have your results compared to industry standards?

And the big one:
How would Coventry compete and win if it could not risk select and had to take all comers at a community rate?
Because that may well be the scenario Coventry, and all its competitors, face in two short years.
Note – this applies almost equally to most every health plan. In fact you could just about replace ‘Coventry’ with Wellpoint, Cigna, Humana, Blue Cross, etc and the same perspective would hold true.
Now I really am going on vacation.


Jul
24

PMSI sale – the numbers

In today’s earnings announcement, AmerisourceBergen, parent company of work comp PBM/ancillary services firm PMSI, detailed the financial impact of the deal.
ABC carried PMSI on the books at about $260 million; by selling the property for $40 million (plus a $10 million contingency) ABC will be taking a $222 million hit as a result of the transaction. On an earnings per share basis the result is 1.37 per share, giving ABC a net loss of $108 million, or 67 cents per share.
Observers who are confused about the recent on-again, off-again status of the PMSI sale can be forgiven for that confusion; ABC has been somewhat schizophrenic about its dealings with PMSI. After putting PMSI on the market early this year, ABC announced last month that the company was not going to sell PMSI after the initial offers came in well under expectations. According to ABC’s CEO David Yost, “We look to PMSI to be on track in the September quarter and into fiscal ’09.”
Contrast this with Yost’s announcement today – “We were very disappointed with PMSI’s performance in this quarter, and after re-evaluating our alternatives, we decided to sell the PMSI workers’ compensation business in order to focus our full attention on our pharmaceutical distribution and related businesses and allow H.I.G. to focus on the opportunities at PMSI.”
ABC’s impatience with the turnaround may have played a role, but from here it looks like the hammering Yost took over ABC’s overall financial performance to date may have been more of a motivator.
HIG, the investment firm that bought PMSI does have some experience in this space with investments in Align Networks and Gould and Lamb. They have been quite successful in selling properties and generating rich returns for their investors, a history that bodes well for PMSI. And for the PMSI employees who add value, are flexible, focus on customers, and don’t buy into the “we do it that way because that’s the way we’ve always done it” nonsense.


Jul
24

PMSI sold, MSC/Express Deal closes

PMSI, the workers comp PBM and ancillary services provider, will announce today that it has been sold to investment firm HIG. Sources within PMSI indicate the stock deal is worth $50 million, of which $10 million is contingent on achieving certain performance measures. Current management will likely remain in place after the deal closes in about 60 days.
The timing of this transaction is coincident with Express Script’s announcement of the closing (sub req) of their acquisition of MSC’s Pharmacy Benefit Management business. Express Scripts is now poised to become one of, if not the largest workers comp PBMs.
These deals are the latest in a series of financial transactions and potential transactions involving work comp PBMs. Cypress Care was recapitalized by investor Brazos Private Equity in November, 2006; Fiserv sought to sell its third party biller/PBM business early last year; Coventry purchased First Script as part of the Concentra transaction, and MSC itself was purchased by Monitor Clipper early in 2005.
PMSI has been struggling of late, losing the Hartford’s business (while retaining SRS (Hartford’s TPA)) to ESI and CNA late last year to Coventry. While PMSI’s parent company, Amerisource Bergen, was somewhat of a distant parent and may not have provided the attention and resources necessary for PMSI to maintain its historical leadership position, there’s no question HIG’s focus and attention will be intense and constant. Private equity management can be quite helpful; it can also be overbearing and short-sighted. And sometimes all three – which may be exactly what PMSI needs to recover its leadership position.
At risk of being accused of burying the lead, here’s what has me puzzled. Sources indicate Express looked closely at PMSI – recently . Yet they plunked down $248 million for MSC’s pharmacy business, when they could have paid a fifth of that for all of PMSI (which includes a robust ancillary services division).
PMSI has been somewhat damaged goods lately due to customer losses, yet MSC was in a similar position less than two years ago after it lost its largest PBM customer, Liberty Mutual, to rival Progressive Medical (PM had half of Liberty and was awarded MSC’s portion).
From here, it looks like a pretty good deal – although PMSI’s financials have been pretty bad lately, $50 million is a very good deal for one of the top two companies in a growing market.


Jul
23

From our good friends at WorkersCompInsider comes this entertaining post on the Massachusetts firefighter/bodybuilder. It’s always great to have a hobby. Especially when one is totally disabled.
Yes, the bodybuilding ex-firefighter is out on disability. Total, complete, permanent disability.
One has to respect Mr Arroyo – He could have given up, resigned himself to a life in front of the TV, with little to look forward to but the next day’s sports pages. But no, in what can only be described as an uplifting (no pun intended) story of perseverance and a willingness to live life to the fullest, Arroyo entered a bodybuilding contest, and competed, just 6 weeks after he was declared fully disabled.
albert-side-chest-lft.jpg
Adding even more drama to the story, Mr Arroyo’s disability was due to an injury to his back suffered when he slipped down some stairs. Unfortunately, no one was there to help him during his time of trouble, or to witness the accident itself.
What’s even more incredible/unbelievable/ridiculous is Mr. Arroyo’s attorney’s statement in response to the recent publicity. Here’s what Attorney Neil Osborne said:”Nothing in his specialized training regiment [sic] for the competition contradicts his neurologist’s documentation of his injuries.” And (this just gets better and better) this was our hero’s sixth injury while on the job.
Here’s a video of Mr Arroyo – got to love the thong.
Oops, late breaking news from another source – this wasn’t a miraculous recovery; it turns out Mr Arroyo has been training for years, has won several body-building contests, and perhaps, just perhaps, his completely-disabling injury is somehow due to his avocation instead of the unwitnessed slip down the stairs.
Just perhaps.


Jul
18

New York gets real

Bowing to the reality of the market, the New York Work Comp Board has issued a revised pharmacy fee schedule for workers comp.
The previous fee schedule based WC pharmacy fees on Medicaid – a linkage that was problematic for at least a dozen reasons. Here are the major ones.
1. Medicaid has ‘positive enrollment’ – members’ eligibility is determined instantly, electronically. In WC, there is no upfront enrollment, therefore retail pharmacies don’t know where to send the claim, or even if the claim has been accepted by an insurer. Work comp requires a lot of manual work, while Medicaid is electronic and instant.
2. The Medicaid reimbursement schedule has been a political football of late, as state legislators, under pressure from declining revenues and increasing service demands, have looked to cut Medicaid costs by cutting prices paid for drugs. California’s decision to cut reimbursement by 10% has resulted in a political/judicial back and forth that is apparently still not resolved. By tying WC reimbursement to Medicaid, pharmacies, PBMs, and payers would be batted back and forth, not knowing from day to day what they should pay for drugs.
3. Medicaid has a formulary which reduces the cost of the drugs to the pharmacies. There is no such formulary in WC (except in a very few states such as Washington), and therefore drug manufacturers won’t give discounts in return for preference in a therapeutic class.
4. The Medicaid FS is actually significantly lower than the contracted prices PBMs pay retail pharmacies. Thus there is no benefit to payers, or retail pharmacies, in working with PBMs. This despite the strong evidence that PBMs, properly implemented and managed, can dramatically reduce utilization (the volume of scripts dispensed).
What drove NY to make the change? Access issues. Claimants were not able to get their scripts filled as pharmacies could not afford to do so under Medicaid reimbursement, and PBMs could not afford to operate in the state while losing money on every script.
That’s not to say the revised FS is much better. In fact, as the second lowest fee schedule in the nation, it represents an incremental improvement at best, and may not be sufficient to keep all stakeholders participating.
Cynics may point to California, and note that PBMs and pharmacies stayed in that market after the FS was based on Medicaid. True, but each state’s Medicaid FS is unique, and CA’s is significantly more reasonable than NY’s.


Jul
14

From whence did work comp come?

Insurance Journal’s new pub MyNewMarkets has an entertaining piece about the history of workers comp, which according to author Chris Boggs, began back in the days of the pirate.
Boggs does allow opinion to influence his rendering of history – notably he claims former German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck “was not known as a socially-conscious ruler; the working conditions of the common man were not necessarily foremost in his mind.”
I beg to differ.
von Bismarck was nothing if not pragmatic, and the fact that he forced passage of the first national health insurance, pension, and disability legislation shows that if anything, he was extremely socially conscious. Any ruler of a European country in the latter half of the nineteenth century had to be socially conscious, as the locus of power was moving rapidly away from the genetically-chosen elite.
The ones who were not socially conscious (e.g. Czar Nicholas Alexander) didn’t survive very long.
Other than that difference of opinion, the piece is well done and provides a brief intro with a promise of more to come.


Jul
11

Regulators dodged a bullet, but another one’s in the chamber

The Medicare vote to rescind the 10% cut in physician reimbursement likely kept many docs in the business of providing medical care to workers comp patients.
But that ‘stay of execution’ ends Jan 1 2010 when a 21% cut is scheduled to go into effect.
As Bob Laszewski has been noting, the current incredibly stupid way we are addressing Medicare physician compensation is resolving nothing, while ensuring we’re right back on the edge in eighteen months.
Long-time readers are undoubtedly tired of me reciting the myriad reasons it is dumb to base WC reimbursement on Medicare. But here’s yet another example – WC is a state-based system where reimbursement is controlled by a political process completely unconcerned about its implications for comp insurers, employers, physicians, or injured workers.
A study completed in 2007 illustrated the problem – low reimbursement rates mean few physicians are willing to treat comp claimants. Among the five states that based their fee schedule on low percentages of Medicare (109% to 125% of Medicare), the percentage of neurologists and orthopaedists that participated in workers’ compensation tended to be a fraction of the available population (9% to 27% for neurologists, 23% to 46% for orthopaedists).
Among the states using Medicare’s RBRVS as the basis for physician reimbursement are Florida, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Hawaii, Maryland, California, Michigan, Ohio, Tennessee, Minnesota, Oregon and Texas.
Yes, most pay above the Medicare rate, and many have built-in inflation adjustments. But physician compensation is still primarily controlled by the politics of Washington.


Jul
3

Third Party Solutions sold

Fiserv has sold 51% of its insurance business, including third party biller Third Party Solutions to a private equity firm. The buyer, Stone Point Capital, also owns workers comp managed care firm Genex and multiple other insurance-related companies, including brokerage, investment, distribution, reinsurance, technology, and claims services.
Fiserv will continue to own 49% of the new company, to be titled Fiserv Insurance Services (I’m hoping they didn’t pay a naming consultancy a lot for that).
Close watchers of the work comp pharmacy business (both of you) will recall that TPS acquired WorkingRx last fall, at the time its sole competitor in the third party biller industry.
What does this mean for you?
Folks familiar with the industry are of the opinion that TPS was a throw-in; Fiserv sought to sell TPS eighteen months ago, and has been trying to sell it off every since. Don’t be surprised if TPS is back on the market once this transaction closes later this month.