Apr
17

Survey of Prescription Drugs in Workers Comp

Drug costs now account for 15% of total medical expense in workers comp, a percentage that has grown dramatically over the last few years. My firm has conducted the only survey of payers focused on prescription drug management in workers comp, and we’re in the midst of the fifth annual survey.
This year’s survey is sponsored by Cypress Care, marking the third consecutive year of their support.
Early findings (subject to change) include:

  • Costs for some payers have stabilized
  • Utilization continues to be the main cost driver
  • There is an increasing recognition of the importance, and potential impact, of clinical management programs

If you are with a workers comp payer and interested in participating in the survey, email infoAThealthstrategyassocDOTcom. Respondents receive a comprehensive, detailed Survey report.
Summaries of the previous four Surveys are available here.


Mar
24

The small frauds

Health care costs are higher because of waste fraud and abuse. How much higher is a subject of debate, but common wisdom suspects we’re paying hundreds of billions more each year than we should.
There are big frauds and abuses and small ones, but my bet is that together the small ones add up to more than all the big ones.
One example – pharmacy. CVS just settled a suit brought by CMS regarding alleged Medicaid fraud. The issue? There are two version of antacid ranitidine, a generic version of Zantac. The tablet form which is much cheaper than the capsule form. CVS allelgedly had a corporate policy of filling Medicaid scripts with the more expensive capsule form, a practice that, if true, would be a direct violation of the law.
While not admitting guilt, CVS did agree to pay the Feds and 15 states almost $37 million, and to stop the practice. The huge pharmacy chain refused to admit guilt, instead an exec gave the usual mumbo-jumbo. But their public comments are revealing – here’s how it was reported in the Florida Sun-Sentinel (March 19)
In a statement, CVS Caremark said, “For many years, the company purchased and stocked the capsule form of ranitidine across its chain of retail stores for dispensing to all patients, not just Medicaid recipients, due to the fact that the acquisition cost of capsules was lower than the cost of tablets”.
Reads like an admission that CVS knew darn well that the capsule version was generating a lot more profit.
What does this mean for you?
Private payers – check those NDC codes, and check ’em carefully. Chances are you’re also paying for versions your docs didn’t order.
Thanks to California HealthLine for the heads up.


Mar
13

Selling your managed care company

You’ve been working hard and smart for five plus years, building your managed care company from a small niche player in a couple of states to a national company with an impressive client list. After all that work, the angel investors are looking to cash in on their investment and you’d like to take a few dollars off the table as well.
Before contacting potential buyers, there are a few things to consider. First, find an investment banker that knows your general business and marketplace. This will speed things up dramatically, reduce the amount of time you have to spend educating, and reduce the likelihood of mistakes due to misunderstanding or misinterpretation. It will also make for a fair and reasonable valuation – one that, in all likelihood, will be less than you think your company is worth.
Second, be brutally honest. Don’t claim your company has customers and/or revenue it doesn’t. Obvious, I know, but rare nonetheless. Potential investors are quite used to exaggerated promises and inflated numbers; surprise them with your honesty and they will be
much more comfortable.
Third, don’t dramatically change your staffing, pricing, or sales process in an effort to ‘clean up’ the company unless you have at least a year before you go to market. These changes are obvious; they serve as a flashing red light warning investors that the business they are looking at today is (perhaps) significantly different from the business that grew so successfully. If the model and processes worked before, don’t change them just to look good for a sale.
Unless, of course, something bad is happening in the market and you are just trying to get out from under before the roof caves in.
Finally, don’t think that just because the bankers on the other side of the table aren’t expert in your space that they won’t learn everything there is to know about your company, your business model and operations, customers, competitors, regulatory landscape, and potential issues over the horizon. They may not be experts, but they can, and will, find experts who know the space, your customers, and the market as least as well as you do.
Done right, the process although time consuming and occasionally maddening, will result in a big payoff and a stronger company. Handled poorly, it will degenerate into an endless back and forth that may well result in a withdrawal of an offer.


Mar
9

Regulators are increasingly seeking politically low-cost ways to reduce workers comp costs. Some have decided to use the Medicaid reimbursement rate for drugs for Workers Comp, evidently figuring that if pharmacies accept it for Medicaid, they’ll do the same for WC. Same ‘logic’ evidently goes for PBMs.
The only problem is it is dead wrong.
1. Unlike Medicaid, there are no copays, restrictive formularies, or other cost- and utilization containment measures. Thus all cost containment efforts in WC for drugs involve resource-intensive Drug Utilization Review processes; pharmacists and clinicians reviewing scripts for appropriateness, medical necessity, potential conflicts and adverse outcomes, and relatedness to the WC medical condition.
2. PBMs pay pharmacies more for WC drugs than for Medicaid drugs; a lot more.
3. Unlike Medicaid, to the extent they exist at all, rebates are much lower in WC. Medicaid rebates are a minimum of 11% of the Average Manufacturer’s Price per unit (and even higher in many states). The rebate revenue significantly reduces states’ costs for drugs. As these rebates are much lower or nonexistent in WC, PBMs do not have rebate dollars to offset their drug costs.
Unlike Medicaid, most workers comp claimants have no idea how WC works, much less who their insurer is; the chances of the claimant presenting with a card is therefore quite low (less than 25% of all WC first fills go to the appropriate PBM). When a Medicaid recipient shows up at a pharmacy, they have been enrolled and thus have a card, and the transaction process is instantaneous and very low cost.
There is no positive enrollment in WC, unless the claimant presents a card, the pharmacy has no way to identify the appropriate PBM. This presents pharmacies with a high level of risk, a level that is not balanced by a reimbursement that makes that risk level tolerable. Specifically;
1. pharmacies are ‘at risk’ for initial fills where they cannot be sure the carrier/employer will accept the claim – this higher risk level requires a higher reimbursement. There is nothing preventing an individual from writing ‘WC’ on a paper script, thereby perpetrating fraud on the pharmacy.
2. the current regs pay pharmacies 25% more for scripts that are ‘controverted’; that is, where the carrier/employer has said they will not (yet) accept the claim
3. The ‘controverted’ situation is very similar to first fills – the carrier/employer has not indicated they will accept the claim, yet the pharmacy is required to fill it, without guarantee of reimbursement
4. the additional risk forced upon the pharmacies may lead them to:
• not fill scripts without a claim number/specific notice from the carrier/employer
• use the claimant’s existing profile (usually a group health PBM card) to fill the script, thereby increasing group health costs
• require the claimant to pay cash which they may, or may not, be able to do
We’re all for reducing work comp medical expense, but the blunt instrument of deep, and inappropriate, cuts in reimbursement for drugs is also counterproductive.
The key driver of prescription drug cost inflation is not the price per pill but utilization – the volume and type of drugs dispensed. The National Council on Compensation Insurance’s recent study on drug costs in workers comp stated “Utilization changes are the driving force in drug cost changes for WC…Utilization is the biggest reason for cost differences between states” (Workers Compensation Prescription Drug Study, 2007 Update; Barry Lipton et al; NCCI, p. 4, 6).
PBMs have adopted and are continuously improving programs designed to address inappropriate utilization. These programs include
• development of clinical evidence-based guidelines for the use of drugs for musculoskeletal injuries
• outreach by PBM physicians in specific cases where the drug treatment plan may be inappropriate
• data mining to identify potentially questionable prescribing patterns including off-label usage of drugs such as Actiq and Fentora
• Prior Authorization of specific drugs (e.g. narcotic opioids, cardiovascular medications).
What does this mean for you?
If PBMs don’t operate in a state or can’t generate any margin, they’ll eliminate any and all utilization control measures.
And drug costs will increase.


Mar
5

Why drug costs are going up.

Because they can.
Brand drug prices went up yet again last year, by over 7%. This on the heels of a similar price increase in 2006, which ‘coincidentally’ occurred after Part D went into effect and millions of seniors suddenly could buy drugs.
But this isn’t the whole story. Price is only part of the equation, the other parts being frequency (what percentage of the population takes drugs) and utilization (how many pills they take).
The frequency and utilization problem is just as bad. But lets focus on price.

Continue reading Why drug costs are going up.


Feb
28

Coventry and PMSI

No, Coventry has not bought PMSI. And I don’t think they will.
As of today, there are still several entities looking at the deal, and as near as I can tell the process is nowhere near complete. Is Coventry looking at PMSI? Probably – as the owner of a competing PBM they’d be foolish not to.
But buying PMSI wouldn’t materially strengthen Coventry’s WC offering. Yes, they’d pick up even more MSA business (which they appear to value); yes, they’d get a major position in the DME/Home health business, but they’d also get a PBM business that is deteriorating, due in no small part to Coventry’s ability to take customers from PMSI.
If I’m Coventry (and both parties are glad that’s not the case) why would I pay a couple hundred million bucks for a property that is deteriorating and I’m beating in the market?
That said, stranger things have happened…


Jan
25

PMSI’s for sale, part 2

SInce I learned of PMSI’s pending sale, I’ve been digging thru financial reports and talking with customers and industry folk to find out more.
Turns out FY 2007 (ended 9/30/07) was a down year for both revenue and profit at PMSI-Tmesys (PMSI). Although top-line increased 1%, that was primarily due to the acquisition of Health Advocates (HA) for $83 million (about 4.2x revenues). When you consider the overall WC Rx inflation rate was 6.5% and add in HA’s revenue, PMSI’s core business actually declined by about $50 million, or around 11% from 2006 to 2007.
The news was worse for profits, which dropped by 45%, while reserves for bad debt increased by $3.7 million. Notably, the MSA business contributed a whopping $12.4 million in gross profit – although that number looks awfully high. Given what they paid for it, I would not be surprised if dollars were shifted around to make the acquisition look good – 4.2 times revenues is awfully expensive.
It should also be pointed out that 2006 was not a stellar year; although revenues increased 4% from the previous year (while WC Rx inflation was close to 10%), profits had declined by 11% from 2005.
Clearly the company’s owners have not acted precipitously.
Competitive pressure certainly played a part in ABC’s decision to sell off the firm; as noted here Coventry has been aggressively pursuing new business, and PMSI has already lost one large customer that by itself will cut 2008 revenues by another 10%.
Despite what some commenters think (and write), I don’t think it is fair to hammer the (relatively) new management at PMSI. The company had started declining years ago, and had started to turn itself around under the prior president, David Weidner. The company also lost its best spokesperson, Phil Walls PharmD, who has since moved onto another PBM. Weidner was replaced by Mark Hollifield, who brought in a new sales and marketing team (can’t speak to the sales side, but the marketing has been rather uninspired).
What does not appear to have changed is the complacent culture at PMSI – although the company had done innovative work in several areas, it was very slow to market, could not move quickly, and seemed more interested in having meetings than delivering on commitments to customers.
Cultures are notoriously hard to change, and this may well be a case in point.
We’ll get into what a buyer would get when next we meet.


Jan
23

Warning on Fentora

The FDA has issued a warning notice for off-label use of Fentora after three deaths were linked to off-label usage of the fentanyl tablet.
One issue may be related to the substitution of Fentora for another powerful pain medication, Actiq. Both are manufactured by Cephalon, but Fentora is absorbed more quickly than is Actiq. Therefore, the same dosage of Fentora may result in more of the drug being absorbed into the bloodstream.
Cephalon has been plagued by accusations of aggressive detailing, including encouraging physicians to prescribe the drug off-label. Another recent article indicates the pharma industry has been aggressively lobbying the FDA to allow this type of detailing, which evidently has been going on for two years despite restrictions against the practice.
Of note to workers compensation insurers, Fentora appears to be becoming increasingly popular for treatment of back pain in some areas.
What does this mean to you?
If you are a WC payer, find out which claimants are taking Fentora and figure out why and if it is appropriate. Not only is the drug dangerous, it is also very expensive.