Aug
3

Where are your drug dollars going?

I spent a good part of the morning in a meeting discussing recent research into societal cost of prescription drug abuse. Here are a couple of stats that got my attention.
Prescription drugs are now the most abused drug, surpassing marijuana among young people.
70% of the prescription drugs abused were obtained directly or from a family member (I may have this slightly misquoted, will correct if necessary).
Emergency room admissions for prescription drug abuse doubled from 2004 to 2008.
Now let’s consider a few other factoids.
Narcotic opioid use in California’s work comp system increased dramatically between 2002 and 2008, with several times more claimants receiving these potent, potentially-addictive medications.
Medical severity is also increasing in the Golden State; I’m not saying there’s a cause:effect relationship here but rather drug costs and usage changes may be contributing to the problem.
OxyContin accounts for just under ten percent of comp drug costs. This drug has been widely associated with abuse; it can be ground up and eaten, inhaled, smoked, or dissolved and injected.
Sorry to ruin your day.


Jul
16

Should Medicaid be the basis for work comp drug fee schedules?

There’s a good bit of activity on the regulatory front as states with work comp pharmacy fee schedules consider possible changes to address the myriad issues inherent in AWP.
A little background will help frame the issue.
First, it’s important to understand the fee schedule amount is only paid if the script doesn’t go thru a PBM, and the vast majority of scripts do go thru a PBM, ensuring the carrier/employer/fund pays substantially less than the fee schedule.
My firm’s survey of large payers indicates network penetration was 82% in 2008. Therefore, fewer than one in five scripts are paid at fee schedule.
Some think setting a fee schedule at Medicaid solves the problem neatly. Were it only that simple.
Let’s look at California, which is the only state using Medicaid (known as Medi-Cal in CA). In point of fact, drug costs per claim are up 72% despite a fee schedule reduction that cut price more than 25%. Clearly, the lower fee schedule did NOT control cost.
I believe what has suffered is the clinical management of drugs; as evidenced by CWCI’s recent report narcotic opioid usage is up 600% over the last few years. In addition, cost per claim is up dramatically – driven primarily by utilization.
Medicaid could be used as the basis for a reimbursement calculation, however Medicaid has several inherent problems.
First, it is a political football, subject to the political winds
. This has caused significant problems in New York already, and has led regulators in California to prevent implementation of the lower MediCal reimbursement rates for work comp. As state budgets become increasingly constrained and as Medicaid greatly expands, we will undoubtedly see more states seek to reduce program costs by price reductions – simple, politically palatable, and score-able.
Second, Medicaid doesn’t cover a some drugs used in comp, especially pain meds and drugs that are not on individual states’ Medicaid formularies. As states seek cost reductions beyond those available from simple across-the-board fee cuts, they will move to tighter formularies covering far fewer medications, reference pricing, and other mechanisms that will effectively limit the drugs on the ‘fee schedule’.
As a result, a Medicaid-based fee schedule would be the subject of ongoing lobbying activity and legislative/regulatory action as it requires constant ‘maintenance’; legislators change reimbursement, drugs came on and off formulary, prices go up and down.
In terms of alternatives, WAC, AWP, and some of the other methodologies are inherently flawed. However there are other standards – standards such as Federal Supply Schedule, Average Manufacturers’ Price that are not subject to the same flawed processes as AWP. Examining these may help stakeholders assess their usefulness as an alternative.
(for a synopsis of the various pricing metrics, click here.
What does this mean for you?
1. Fee schedules for drugs are not applicable to most drugs paid under workers comp as PBM rates apply.
2.States will move away from AWP; it will be important to understand the alternatives, their pros and cons.


Jul
15

Narcotic usage in workers comp – what’s really going on?

There’s a bit of confusion in the comp pharmacy management space, as there appears to be contradictory evidence from two respected sources about the use of narcotic opioids in workers comp.
First, everyone agrees there’s just far too many claimaints getting far too many far too potent narcotics. Perhaps not in those exact terms, but close enough. Heavy duty, potent, potentially addictive, divertable, high-street-value drugs are dispensed far too often in comp.
But there is a bit of disagreement about exactly what’s going on.
First, CWCI, the always-authoritative California Workers Comp Institute, has been researching and reporting on this problem for several years, and their data shows the use of narcotic opioids is increasing. Dramatically.
In contrast, one of the largest work comp PBMs, PMSI, recently published their results which indicate a decline in usage of this type of drug early on in the claim cycle. I asked Maria Sciame, PharmD, PMSI’s Director of Clinical Services what she thought might account for the decrease in the use of opioid analgesics in the acute phase of injury.
Here’s her take (and I quote):
1. increased physician awareness of the potential negative effects of opioids
2. additional organized opioid monitoring strategies (mandatory reporting) associated with opioids may have reduced “off the cuff” opioid prescribing
3. increased awareness of pain management guidelines that call for non-opioids for the initial treatment of mild to moderate pain
4. decreased prescriber fear regarding the use of non-steroidal anti-inflammatory agents over the past year…remember the FDA warnings that have been issued within the past few years regarding the negative cardiovascular affects associated with NSAID use…started with Vioxx…physicians are becoming less cautious and have regained their comfort level with the use of NSAIDs again; thus, replacing narcotics for acute injuries with NSAIDS.
There are a couple other factors worth considering.
a) PMSI’s business all flows thru a PBM, whereas CWCI’s script data is from payers that use PBMs and some that don’t (even in this day and age, some payers don’t use PBMs; go figure). PBMs have clinical management programs in place to address things like early usage of narcotics.
b) CWCI’s data isn’t specific to early usage, whereas PMSI’s is (in this instance)
c) CWCI is specific to California; PMSI’s is national and as NCCI has reported, there are dramatic differences in prescribing patterns across states. NCCI’s research also indicates narcotic usage across the country has stabilized somewhat of late after several years of consistent increases.
So, what does this mean for you?
If you aren’t using a PBM, get with the program.
If you are, find out if they are actively, assertively, and effectively managing narcotic opioid scripts and claimants on those scripts. If they aren’t, find out why not (hint, it may be because you’re not able to provide data or support their efforts, if that’s not it, they’ve got some explaining to do)
Ask for data on narcotic usage for claims less than a year old, and older ones as well, and decide if your results are acceptable.


Jul
14

Work comp pharmacy – one company’s experience

The work comp pharmacy benefit management industry is growing increasingly sophisticated, and the release of PMSI’s Annual Drug Trends Report this morning adds to the trend.
Many of the larger work comp PBMs produce similar reports, providing deep insights into cost drivers, the effectiveness of solutions, and trends that anyone with any responsibility for med loss would be well advised to read.
Here are the quick takes from my admittedly not in-depth read of PMSI’s effort.
1. Price was up significantly last year, climbing 4.7%. This is heavily influenced by the price increases pushed thru by big pharma on brand drugs last year in anticipation of health reform.
2. Utilization was up only slightly, driven by more days supply per script.
3. Mail order utilization was up 3.6%, which undoubtedly contributed to the higher utilization as mail order scripts tend to include more days’ supply than those dispensed by retail stores.
4. The average number of scripts per injured worker was 11.1 in 2009. Yep, eleven point one. That’s a lot of drugs.
5. The report includes an interesting chart graphically illustrating the impact of the age of the claim on scripts per claimant; claims a year old typically had around three scripts at an average price per script of thirty bucks or so; in contrast ten year old claims had 23 scripts averaging over $180 each.

6. Generic efficiency (the percentage of scripts that could have been filled with a generic version) remained at 92%. This is driven by several factors, including state regulations (some have mandatory generic language and others are considering adopting it), PBM and payer intervention and outreach, and the ‘macro’ pharmacy market’s introduction of new brands. Generic efficiency and ‘conversion’ is key to cost management; according to PMSI (and consistent with other reports) each one point increase in generic utilization reduces cost by 1.4%.
7. Pharmacy in comp remains primarily, and I’d argue overwhelmingly, driven by pain. PMSI’s data suggests over three-quarters of drug spend was for pain management – one of the key differences between work comp pharmacy and group/Medicare pharmacy.
8. Our old nemesis OxyContin again accounted for a lot of comp dollars, with 9.9% of spend allocated to the brand and generic versions. On the good news side, Actiq and Fentora usage declined significantly (type ‘actiq’ into the ‘search this site’ text box above and to the right for plenty of reasons why this is a very good thing).
9. Finally, the average days supply of narcotic analgesicvs was up 6.4% while the number of claimants getting those drugs actually declined. This may be due to those claimants who could use alternative meds getting off narcotics (or not starting on them in the first place). As a result, the claimants still taking these drugs are more likely to need more meds.
There’s a lot more meat in the report, lots of detail on which drugs are driving how much utilization, changes in utilization by class of drug, and most importantly, the impact of clinical programs on utilization and drug mix.
What does this mean to you?
Two things.
While PMSI is one of the largest PBMs, remember that these data refer to their customers’ experience and therefore may not be exactly equivalent to your book of business. That said, don’t use that as an excuse if your stats aren’t up to snuff – instead look for ways to get better.
As you pack for that summer vacation, grab a copy of your PBM’s report (go to their site and find it there, or call your rep and have them send it over) and perhaps a couple others.
You know you want to, and you can always hide it inside a Cosmo or Men’s Health to prevent mocking stares from the knuckleheads on the next beach towel.


Jun
29

Average Wholesale Price – not dead yet…

Wolters-Kluwer, publisher of the Medi-Span pharmaceutical pricing database, just announced it will not stop publishing that database at the end of 2011, or any other date certain.
The reasoning behind the decision appears to be the lack of consensus around a replacement for the AWP standard.
According to W-K’s press release, “discontinuation of AWP before development and industry-wide acceptance of a viable alternative price benchmark to replace AWP could create significant customer problems and confusion or disruption throughout the entire healthcare industry. We also recognize that changes to the data published in our drug information products may impact our customers’ businesses and require significant lead time for them to make corresponding technical and contractual adjustments. It appears that consensus around a comprehensive alternative pricing standard will not be reached this year…”
Included in the release is a rather detailed discussion of precisely what the ‘AWP’ is – and is not. W-K has obviously taken notice of the litigation surrounding AWP, and the release, and further details provided in an accompanying document [opens pdf], provide a pretty very thorough primer on AWP and the W-K database’s development, methodology, and limitations.
The rationale – there is no consensus on a replacement for AWP. rings true As flawed as AWP is, there are inherent problems with alternate pricing methodologies, problems that are not dissimilar from those associated with AWP. The most significant issue is the fact that AWP is NOT an Average nor a Wholesale Price. The MediSpan database is comprised of self-reported data, does not include all ‘wholesalers’ nor rebates and other behind-the-scenes financial transactions, and therefore does not reflect actual pricing. Similar issues plague Average Sales Price, Wholesale Acquisition Cost, and other metrics.

What does this mean for you?

This may motivate buyers and other stakeholders to get cracking on an alternate – either one of the current options or perhaps something new and different. What is abundantly clear is AWP remains flawed – at best. The failure of the industry to find a suitable alternative shows just how opaque the entire pharma pricing/rebate/cost picture is.


Jun
28

CVS Caremark and Walgreens – what happened?

The public spat between retail drug giant Walgreens and PBM/retail giant CVS Caremark ended last week. The first question most will ask is ‘who won’? After asking that myself, I realized that’s not the most important issue.
From here, it looks like the winners will be employers and members, who should be able to continue to access Walgreens thru Caremark (the giant PBM has some 2200 corporate clients and claims 53 million lives. As the financial details of the deal weren’t (publicly) disclosed, we don’t know if:
a) Caremark agreed to stop shifting Walgreens customers to Caremark mail order;
b) Caremark will stop trying to move members from Walgreens stores over to CVS (one of Walgreens’ allegations)
c) Walgreens decided the pain was going to outweigh the benefits of dropping Caremark
d) the execs decided to set aside their concerns when their stock prices took a hit.
This last likely had some influence, as both companies (in theory) exist to serve their shareholders. Both entities’ share prices declined after the spat became public; when the resolution was announced share values jumped 5% for each company.
Sources indicate that the deal included compromise on two key points – Caremark will continue to market PBM options that favor CVS stores and Walgreens will get their concerns about pricing inconsistencies addressed.
There’s no question the loss of Walgreens, the nation’s largest pharmacy chain with 7000+ stores, would have significantly hurt Caremark’s marketing efforts, especially in New York, San Francisco, and other key markets where Walgreens is the dominant chain. And the timing was tough for the big PBM, coming just as large employers were making decisions about their 2011 benefit plans. Perhaps Caremark felt a bit of pressure from current customers, and decided to compromise rather than risk losing significant share to competitors Medco and Express Scripts.
Conversely, although Caremark’s prescription business only accounted for 7% of revenues, the people picking up scripts also bought cosmetics, batteries, toiletries, and other products that probably accounted for a few more percentage points of revenue for Walgreens. In the low-margin retail pharmacy business, the loss of these profitable dollars would be very, very hard to offset.
What does this mean for you?
The takeaway for me is a renewed realization of just how interdependent providers and payers are.
As you think about markets in health care, it is helpful to remember most are highly mature with significant barriers to entry especially for payers.


Jun
17

Regulation, Legislation, and Unintended Consequences

I attended a meeting of work comp insurance execs in DC yesterday that addressed, among other topics, the dynamic situation in Texas, fee schedules for drugs, pending Federal legislation and the potential impact on comp, and the Gulf oil spill and its potential ramifications for Jones Act and Longshore/Harbor workers coverages.
While there wasn’t a common theme (beyond the obvious) at the outset, by the end of the morning I was struck (as were several others in attendance) by the unintended consequences of past actions, and potential adverse consequences of future legislation and regulation.
As an example.
California slashed the work comp pharmacy fee schedule just about in half six years ago. Since that time, the number of scripts per claimant has increased 25% and costs per claimant are up 31% (CWCI stats). And that’s not the worst of it. Schedule II narcotics have gone from less than one percent of scripts to almost six percent, a six-fold increase.
Why? How could costs go up if the fee schedule cut prices so deeply?
Simple. Some bad actors figured out how to game the system by repacking drugs and inventing their own prices, prices that were several times higher than they should have been. OK, that was fixed, albeit several years, and several hundred million dollars, later.
But there’s another problem, one highlighted by the huge growth in narcotic dispensing – PBMs could not afford to effectively manage the drugs dispensed to claimants.
PBMs make their margin on the delta between what payers pay the PBM for scripts and what the PBM pays the pharmacy. When that delta is negative, as it is in California, there isn’t any money to pay for data mining to identify potentially problematic prescribers; pharmacies that have low generic fill rates; claimants taking multiple narcotics and/or other meds that may conflict with those narcotics. And if they can identify the issues, they can’t pay pharmacists and physicians to review medical records, contact the treating physician, discuss the issues, and resolve any disagreement.
Sure, PBMs and payers could decide to operate on a cost-plus basis, but there are business reasons payers prefer bundled pricing – its easier to assign it to a file, simpler to administer, and easier to report to clients and regulators.
That’s not to say all PBMs don’t try to clinically manage claimants’ drugs – many do, and do a pretty good job given their severely limited resources. The payers that operate in multiple jurisdictions know that the PBM’s fees in other states subsidize their California drug spend…and as long as California is the only state with a catastrophically low pharmacy fee schedule, that’s OK (unless you’re a California only payer, in which case good luck finding a PBM that will handle your pharmacy at fee schedule). But if other states decide to use a similarly low fee schedule, the wheels fall off the system.
This is but one example of unintended consequence of a seemingly obvious and easy way to reduce comp costs – costs actually increased dramatically, and I’d argue that length of disability did as well for those claimants on narcotics that otherwise would not have been.
The pending sunset of pharmacy networks in Texas is another example; due to the wording of Texas’ comp reform legislation (as interpreted by the decision makers in Texas), PBMs can’t operate in the state after 12/31/2010. There’s a good bit of activity in Austin as various entities attempt to resolve this situation before the end of the year, and there’s some hope those efforts will be successful. That said, there’s no question a lot of work is being done by a lot of people who are tasked with cleaning up the ‘unintended consequence’ of unfortunately-worded legislation.
What does this mean for you?
As some smart person said years ago, “What makes you think you’ll have time to fix it if you don’t have the time to do it right to begin with”. Lest readers construe this as a ‘blame the regulator/legislator’ rant – it isn’t. Rather, stakeholders must engage with the people tasked with addressing these issues – before the laws are passed and regulations written. And yes, regulators and legislators would be well served to listen to those who live these issues every day.


Jun
15

Work comp pharmacy fee schedules – what’s the answer

The evidence is pretty clear – low fee schedules don’t have much, if any, impact on drug costs. Sure, they give the appearance of action, and some actuaries and politicians are able to claim future cost reductions based solely on slashing drug fee schedules from some multiple of AWP to some fraction of AWP, or perhaps even a state’s Medicaid rate. But the data – whether from NCCI, CWCI, or my own firm’s surveys, suggest that the price per pill (with some notable exceptions) is much less important in the scheme of things than how many and what type of pills are dispensed to claimants.
Exhibit One is CWCI’s recent analysis of drug costs post implementation of MediCal as the basis for the work comp fee schedule. Alex Swedlow (one of the best and brightest analysts in the business) and John Ireland’s analysis found “significant post-reform growth in both the average number of prescriptions and the average payments per claim for prescription medications. Between calendar years 2005 and 2007, the number of prescriptions per claim in the first year following a work injury increased 25 percent, while first-year pharmaceutical payments per claim increased 36 percent.” [emphasis added]
Yes, after slashing the fee schedule from AWP+40% for generics and AWP+10% for brand (plus dispensing fees) to something closer to AWP-50% Generic /AWP-20% Brand, drug costs per claim went up. A lot. But that’s not the worst of it.
The biggest percentage gainer? Schedule II narcotics – the heavy-duty stuff, associated with significant risk of addiction and abuse – went from less than one percent of scripts to almost six percent – a 600% jump in three years.
Why? One theory, which I’ve tested in conversations with several clinical pharmacists, is the drastic decrease in reimbursement in the Golden State left PBMs with no funds to do any real Drug Utilization Review (DUR), and even less to intervene on potentially high-cost, high-impact claims. PBMs make their money on the delta between what they charge the payer and what the retail pharmacy charges them; in almost all cases, PBMs’ retail contracts call for reimbursement above the CA MediCal rate.
Tough to make that up on volume…
I’m meeting with interested folks in DC tomorrow to discuss this issue, and perhaps to think thru some potential alternatives to AWP, or God forbid, Medicaid as the basis for comp Rx fee schedules.
And as I prepare for the conversation, I’m thinking that a fee schedule based on Usual and Customary has some appeal.
U&C in pharmacy is the cash price for that drug on that day at that pharmacy; think $4 for the long list of generics pioneered by Walmart (which, by the way, is lower than what Walmart charges comp PBMs for the same drugs). Unlike other U&Cs, it is tougher to game, can be reported and collected electronically, and bears some relevance to market price – unlike AWP, which is known as ‘Ain’t What’s Paid’ as it doesn’t factor in rebates, volume discounts, and other price-reducing mechanisms. True work comp drug geeks will know that 33 states currently use AWP as the basis for their fee schedules.
U&C isn’t perfect – any time you base reimbursement on a rate that can be set by the payee, you open yourself up to abuse. But risk of abuse or gaming is likely pretty low – pharmacies see very few work comp scripts, and aren’t likely to play games with their cash price customers just to make a few more bucks on a comp patient. And pharmacy chains do tend to alter pricing to respond to market demands, making U&C at least somewhat credible.
Perhaps best of all, U&C is going to be around for the long term – unlike the version of AWP that is most popular which will disappear within a year.


Jun
9

CVS Caremark v Walgreens – Who’s going to blink?

This morning’s announcement by CVS Caremark that they are terminating their contracts with Walgreens in 30 days ups the ante in the ongoing battle between the two huge pharmacy firms. The decision came after Walgreen’s earlier announcement that it was not going to renew its contracts with the big PBM/retailer due to ‘irreconcilable differences’.
After Walgreen’s shot across CVS Caremark’s bow earlier this week, Caremark’s stock took a hit, dropping to its 52-week low after an 8% decline. Walgreens’ valuation has also suffered, altho less than CVS/Caremark’s.
There are a lot of moving parts here, which we’ll try to briefly summarize.
First, retail pharmacy chains have been suspicious of CVS Caremark ever since the two companies merged several years ago, concerned that the PBM (Caremark) would favor the retail chain (CVS) over other retail chains, such as Walgreens, Rite-Aid, and independents and food/drug combos including WalMart. Walgreens isn’t the only retailer complaining.
Second, we’re in the bidding and contracting phase for next year’s PBM contracts, and the loss of Walgreens’ 7500 stores will throw a rather large X factor into big buyers’ decision matrices. How that plays out has certainly been thought through at both companies; what actually happens will determine who ends up on top.
Third, Caremark will also terminate Walgreens from at least one of their Part D offerings. The fallout from this will be much less clear-cut; seniors may well stick with the retail store where they’re comfortable and feel taken care of, and move to a competing PBM that includes Walgreens.
Fourth, staff are likely dancing in the halls at Caremark competitors Express and Medco; both companies have seen a slight uptick in their stock prices, and the timing couldn’t be better for their sales efforts.
What’s going to happen?
Some think Walgreens is going to blink. Caremark’s business accounts for 7% of Walgreens’ revenue, and that doesn’t include the additional sales from Caremark members who pick up essentials along with their scripts. That’s a lot of revenue. Walgreens has a bit of a history of backing down; we’ll see.
Others are of the mind that Walgreens wouldn’t have pushed it this far, this publicly, if they weren’t fully prepared to end the relationship. Walgreens has certainly calculated the margins on this revenue, estimated how much they’ll keep, and decided they are better off losing lower margin business today, and certainly have assessed Caremark’s future strategy and decided things were only going to get worse. Better to cut their losses now and move on than to slowly bleed.
If the latter is indeed the outcome, Walgreens will certainly have to push retail and one-to-one marketing much harder. They will have to convince consumers that they are better served by Walgreens than any other pharmacy. That will take a significant investment on the marketing and promotion side over and above what’s been spent historically.
UPDATE – moments ago Walgreens released the following – it is increasingly clear that if there’s any blinking to be done, it isn’t going to be on the part of the pharmacy chain.
“We are disappointed but not surprised that CVS Caremark has taken this action. In making our decision not to participate in any new and renewed plans by CVS Caremark, we sought to minimize any disruption to existing relationships between pharmacists and patients. CVS Caremark’s move plainly contradicts its own statement on June 7 that their mission is to provide broad access and choice for consumers. Their patent disregard for patient choice and broad access reflected in today’s decision reinforces our conviction that it would not have been in the best interests of our patients, pharmacists or shareholders to grow our business with CVS Caremark. Regardless of CVS Caremark’s decision, we are confident of our ability to continue to grow our business as a provider in hundreds of other pharmacy benefit networks and as a direct provider to employers.”
Interestingly, no one thinks Caremark is likely to back down.
What does this mean for you?
A window into the coming battles between insurers and providers, with insights into employer- and consumer-driven buying.

predictive modeling
And
artificial intelligence


Jun
7

Walgreens fires CVS Caremark

Walgreens announced this morning it will sever ties with PBM giant CVS Caremark.
The news came in an announcement from Walgreens that identified several reasons for the decision including pricing inconsistencies, movement of patients frm Walgreens to caremark’s mail order program, and other business practices that appeared to favor CVS over Walgreens.
While I have no inside information on this, it undoubtedly came after a series of escalating discussions between the two companies, the last of which may have been ultimatums from both parties.
While some may see this as the last step in a game of brinksmanship, Walgreens would not have made this decision lightly; the change pushes a lot of buyers out of their stores, buyers who also purchase toiletries electronics and other goods that make up the majority of Walgreens retail sales.
What does this mean for you?
If Caremark is the network used by your PBM, start looking. Walgreens’ actions may inspire smaller pharmacy chains to rethink their Caremark relationships.