Oct
19

H1N1 – the impact on employers

Of the many topics worthy of attention, I’ve been remiss in not learning more about swine flu, aka the H1N1 virus.
According to the CDC, to date there have been 9000 hospitalizations and over 600 deaths due to H1N1, and more are coming. There’s no doubt H1N1 will have a significant impact on employers – and also no doubt many have yet to plan adequately.
Here are a couple things to ponder…
1. If an employee gets sick after exposure at work (think teachers…) is that a work comp claim?
2. If a bunch of workers get sick, should you shut down operations for a while? If so, can employees work from home?
Broadspire, the big TPA, is hosting a webinar on H1N1 le\d by Jake Lazarovic, MD, the company’s medical director and in my experience a thoughtful and insightful clinician. The webinar is going to be held today (Monday) at 3 est, Wednesday at 1 est, and Friday at 9 est. Click on the links for more info.
Note – Broadspire is not a client.


Oct
14

What you missed on MCM

For at least a couple weeks, many of the 1642 people who subscribe to MCM didn’t receive notices when new posts went up. It looks like we’ve figured out the problem (electronic fingers crossed), so here’s what’s been on the blog while we were in a technical hiatus.
Yesterday I opined that the recent AHIP/PwC report is more right than wrong; the report misses a lot – and much of what it misses is less than favorable to the report’s funders – health insurance companies. But the central point is indeed accurate; without a tough, enforceable universal mandate, you can’t force insurers to take all comers without charging more for higher risks or excluding them altogether.
Last week was devoted to the recent report by the state of Texas’ Research and Evaluation Group’s report on workers comp networks. The initial post generated a good bit of dialogue with the report’s authors wherein they clarified a confusing (at least to me and several large payer clients) statement; the follow up post detailed the issue, adn explored another concern; “the report didn’t note that three of the networks are provided by one company – Coventry, which also administers a network that is likely underpinning much of the ‘non-network’ category.”
The ‘Texas Week’ concluded with a post on the larger issue with the report – the fallout in workers comp “C” suites, and the potential damage to managed care.
Two posts the week before covered the AmComp meeting in NYC, with one lamenting the lack of concern about medical costs among work comp execs and another summarizing a talk by industry veteran John Burton.
Before I got all wrapped up in workers comp, i handicapped the health reform odds, saying “If the Baucus bill comes out of committee with unified Democratic support, that tells a lot. And if Snowe signs on, that’s even more telling…The Democrats are almost all-in on health reform; at the end it will come down to some Dems deciding if they’re better off holding their nose and voting in favor or handing the victory to the GOP.”

So far, looks like those Dems are indeed holding their collective nose.

This was preceded by a confession – I’m one of those nerds that actually reads Health Affairs – the latest issue has a great piece on the primacy of price in health care inflation. I don’t necessarily agree, but the authors make a compelling case.
It appears that the problem started just before the end of September; readers can always check the main page, sort by category, or type in key words to find specific posts.
Thanks for the forbearance, and here’s hoping the gremlins are back in wherever gremlins live..


Jun
10

The NYTimes on health reform; we expect better

Earlier this week the NYTimes’ Robert Pear did a piece that delved into the Dartmouth Atlas of Healthcare, one of my all-time favorite publications. The Atlas, and the research that spawned it, provides a clear and detailed picture of the cottage industry that is American health care; practice patterns vary wildly and widely.
As just one example, the rate of back surgeries for Medicare members is five times higher in Fort Myers than in Miami, while the hip fracture repair rate is essentially identical. And no, it’s not because the population is different or sicker, it is because that’s just the way medicine is practiced in those two areas.
Well, despite the terrific, well-respected, and well-regarded research behind the Atlas, the NYT got this one wrong, citing some folks who claimed that it is inaccurate, biased, or just plain wrong.
Author Robert Pear is usually one of the best in sorting thru the chaff to find the wheat, but he quoted several individuals without comment, even when the quotes were flat-out wrong. Pear failed to refute critics, even when it would have taken precious little research to do so.
Here are a couple examples:
“There is too much uncertainty about the Dartmouth study to use it as a basis for public policy,” said Senator John Kerry, Democrat of Massachusetts. “Researchers can’t explain why some areas of the country spend more on health care than others. There are many reasons spending could vary: higher costs of living, sicker people or more teaching hospitals.”
Wrong, Senator. Absolutely, flat-out, incontrovertibly wrong.
There is almost no uncertainty about the study and little confusion about why spending is different. It isn’t sicker people, and the issue of cost of living and excess hospital costs are discussed in detail – and corrected for – in the Atlas. The Mayo Clinic among other excellent providers delivers great care for a lot less money than hospitals in your state, and there are wide variations in hospital admission patterns between New Haven and Boston – patients are admitted far more often for COPD in Boston than in New Haven. That’s just practice pattern variation, for no reason other than ‘that’s the way we do it’ in Boston.
And this.
“Dr. Michael L. Langberg, senior vice president of Cedars-Sinai Medical Center in Los Angeles, is among the critics.
“The statement that Medicare costs can be cut by 30 percent has been repeated so many times that it has come to be viewed as a proven fact by some,” Dr. Langberg said in a recent letter to the Senate Finance Committee. “It is not a fact. It is a gross oversimplification of an untested theory.”
Dr. Langberg endorsed the goal of covering the uninsured, but said, “We do not believe that rushing to make large cuts in Medicare payments to hospitals is the right way to fund that coverage.”
Good to see that automatic kneejerk response is still functioning. There is no question, none, that much of US health care spending is wasted on unproven procedures, hospitalization of patients that could be treated on an outpatient basis, and for devices and drugs with minimal positive impact on health.
Maggie Mahar does a much more in-depth dismantling the disappointing reporting/writing/editing by the Times here.


Apr
14

Why PPO litigation is increasing

PPOs, or Preferred Provider Organizations, have been around for a couple dozen years. They are networks of credentialed (with varying degrees of rigor) doctors, hospitals, and ancillary providers that have agreed to provide lower rates for ‘members’ in return for some measure of exclusivity/promise that patients will be directed to use them. I’d note that this ‘promise’ is often not fulfilled, at least in the eye of the provider. That’s a whole separate issue, one we will likely get to in a future post.
As one good friend puts it, ‘PPOs are a box of contracts’, and not many PPO firms do much more than recruit, credential, negotiate, and contract.
Their popularity waxes and wanes, roughly in line with the underwriting cycle (as cost trends decrease, PPOs tend to grow, as cost trends increase, buyers seek more controlled networks and medical management systems).
Typically PPOs are owned by a large group health plan or specialty company such as a workers comp managed care firm. Many PPOs were built to market/sell to health plans and workers comp payers – Rockport, Coventry, and Interplan are examples of ‘vended PPOs’, as opposed to those built for the exclusive use of a healthplan.
The problem
There can be several issues with PPOs; lack of direction by the payer, inaccurate data, failure to maintain credentialing standards and ‘stacking’ are some of the more prevalent.
But of late another issue has been appearing more and more frequently – providers claiming they are not subject to a PPO contract and therefore should be reimbursed at U&C, or in the case of workers comp in many states, the state fee schedule.
Digging into the disagreements that arise when payers assert the providers are subject to a contracted discount, it looks like there are a few contributing factors.
First, some providers have contracts with many health plans and networks, and it canbe tough to keep them all straight. And, the PPO may have changed its name, merged with another firm, or been acquired since the original PPO contract was signed.
Those are the easy ones.
A knottier issue is caused by the mechanism of ‘provider selection’. When the provider’s bill comes into the healthplan/bill repricer, it is ‘checked’ against a database to determine if it is from a contracted, or participating, provider (known as a ‘par’ provider). This checking could occur either at the health plan/repricer, or the bills could be electronically sent to the PPO for the PPO to check par status and apply the discount.
What determines ‘par’ status is often the source of the problem. For example, PPOs want as many ‘hits’ as possible, so they err on the side of counting a provider as par if at all possible. The more hits, the more money they make (often), and the better they look to the payer. Payers like more hits because then the managed care folks can show the savings they deliver due to the discounts. So the payer side of the equation is motivated to use logic that assigns as many bills as possible to the par bucket.
To do that, payers often use a provider TIN (tax identification number) as the only criterion to determine par status. If a bill is from a provider with a TIN that matches some contract somewhere in the PPO company’s database, than the discount is taken. Payers may also use address, provider first name last name, and/or phone, but most try to use as few criteria as possible.
But large provider groups and hospitals and health systems often use the same TIN for many different service areas – outpatient surgery, inpatient, rehab, pharmacy, hospitalists, occupational medicine. And they rarely offer the same discount deal across all service types and locations. Some service types may not even participate due to the internal structure and demands of the health system.
Here’s real world example, provided by a consulting client. A bill from an occ med clinic hits a payer, who determines it is a par provider due solely to the TIN match. A 30% discount is taken, and the check cut. But the occ med clinic is not part of the original contract, which specifically states that discount is for inpatient medical services only.
The provider complains to the payer, who contacts the PPO, who eventually pulls the contract, says ‘oh, yeah, here’s the problem’, asks the occ med clinic to resubmit the bill, after which the bill may – or may not – be paid correctly.
Now multiply this by the hundreds, and it is easy to understand why some providers, fed up by the paperchase, are getting downright litigious. This leads to providers suing payers over a few dollars on an office visit – not to get those few dollars, but to force the payer to apply the correct repricing methodology.
If the PPO is the one doing the repricing (as is often the case), there is considerably less incentive to fix the problem. The PPO doesn’t have to handle all the calls (although in many cases they are involved at some level), figures many providers will not fight it as it isn’t worth it, and even if they do that’s a small price to pay for all those fees.
And that’s one major reason there’s so much litigation in the PPO world these days.


Apr
1

Coventry to acquire UnitedHealth Group

Industry sources informed MCM late today that, in a stunning move, Coventry Healthcare agreed to acquire health plan giant UnitedHealth Group. For several days there had been rumors that UHG would snap up Coventry, the troubled mid-tier health plan, but events of the last few days led to grave concern at UHG that the Ingenix database problems might bring down the parent company. Reportedly the board felt it had ‘little choice but to get what we can while we can’.
The deal was done over the last two days, evidently triggered by the appearance of UHG CEO Steve Hemsley before Sen Jay Rockefeller’s Senate Committee. Hemsley and Ingenix CEO Mike Slavitt were ‘hammered’ by Rockefeller and his fellow Senators, who were particularly incensed at the health plan execs inability or unwillingness to “acknowledge consumers’ concerns about whether they were being shortchanged.”
The hearing was quite contentious, but there was at least one light moment. At one point, responding to a Senator’s pointed questioning about UHG’s conflict of interest, Slavitt said “”There is an important difference between an inherent conflict and the actual practice of bias–the latter is something neither I nor my employees nor our parent company would ever tolerate…” Senator Rockefeller reportedly whispered to a colleague “huh? that guy talks like a politician…”
Sources indicate Hemsley called old friend and colleague, current Coventry CEO Allen Wise, to commiserate shortly after he and Slavitt left the Senate hearing room while they were en route to National Airport. “I don’t want to be AIG’ed”, Hemsley reportedly told Wise; “I can’t believe there’s all this fuss over a lousy few hundred million bucks…I just want to run my company and be left alone, and now this McCaskill woman says she’s going to be on me like white on rice…”
Wise had thought he was close to a deal with his old employer to sell Coventry for a slight premium over the current stock price (around $13). Instead, Hemsley told him he and the UHG board had decided to get out of the health plan business, and were going to sell the company as quickly as possible. A deal came together very quickly, with overall terms agreed to before Hemsley and Slavitt boarded their flight for a return to MInneapolis. (terms were not disclosed)
One of the key motivators for UHG was the concern on the part of UHG’s board and Hemsley that they would be back in front of Rockefeller et al repeatedly, and would be ‘the poster child for bad health plans’. The Senator had concluded the hearing by telling Hemsley and Slavitt that he was going to order the GAO to determine if and how Ingenix’ database had been used to shortchange federal employees who had accessed out of network providers.
Slavitt was reportedly quite shaken by the dressing-down during the hearing, and was ‘close to tears’ as he exited the chamber. Hemsley was seen to be comforting Slavitt, patting him on the shoulder and murmuring “now, now, it will all be all right” as they walked towards their waiting limo.
When reached for comment, Hemsley refused to confirm or deny the deal, although he did say “I actually had to fly commersh to DC; do you have any idea what a hassle that is?” Hemsley was referring to the Board’s command that he not use one of UHG’s fleet of corporate jets, and instead fly Northwest to attend the hearing. (On a side note, Hemsley reportedly said “Northwest… isn’t DC southeast of here?”)


Mar
30

Why a public health plan option isn’t anti-competitive

Perhaps the biggest battle brewing in Congress in the health reform war is that of the public option. As I said back in January, “Opponents claim that the Feds would have an unfair advantage due in part to their sheer size; they’re just so big that private plans could not compete.” Some Republicans and their affiliated think tanks continue to complain private health plans will not be able to compete with a public option as the public plan will just dictate pricing to providers, and they don’t have the capital and financial stability requirements forced on private plans.
They’re half right. Re the capital requirements, they’ve got a valid argument. As we know all too well with Medicare and Medicaid, the Feds (and we taxpayers) know we have an ultimate unfunded liability in excess of $22 trillion, but that figure doesn’t show up on any formal financial statements.
But when they complain about pricing, that’s a red herring – for two reasons.
First, physicians don’t have to accept Medicare or Medicaid, and wouldn’t have to agree to any ‘public option’ pricing. In fact many docs don’t accept Medicare today. As participants in the free market, they are able to opt out if they feel the compensation is too low – and many do.
The other factor is just as simple – pricing is but one component of the health cost equation. The others are utilization and frequency. ‘Utilization’ is the number of a specific type of services used by a patient, while ‘Frequency’ is the percentage/number of patients that use that type of service.
Here’s an example. For MRIs, the total cost calculation might be 10 million patients (frequency) X 1.2 MRIs per patient (utilization) X $800 per MRI (price).
Sure, price is a factor – but it is not the most significant factor – not by a long shot. By keeping patients out of the hospital, a private plan would eliminate utilization and prevent price from ever becoming a factor. So, even if a service area was dominated by a public plan, a private plan that did a really good job of keeping members healthy and out of the hospital would deliver lower costs – even if their hospital stays, when they did occur, were more expensive.
Those lower medical costs would enable the private plans to offer lower premiums, which in turn would attract more members, and those members’ dollars. The private payers that could deliver better health would also deliver better returns to their investors, while taking share from both the public plan option and other, less successful private plans.
The other reason – markets are already monopsonies
As noted previously, there’s another reason the arguments against a public plan don’t stand up. Opponents complain that the government’s market power would allow it to dominate a market, thereby making it impossible for a private plan to compete.
The reality today is that almost every market is already dominated by a very few health plans, so much so that in most markets, there really is very little market competition amongst health plans.
Here are a few factoids using 2005 data; if anything there has been more market consolidation, so these percentages are even higher today…
– 96% of HMO/PPO markets are deemed highly concentrated
– 99% of HMO markets are highly concentrated
– in 96% of markets, at least one insurer has share higher than 30%
– in almost two-thirds of the markets, at one insurer has share greater than 50%
– in a quarter of the markets, one insurer has share at or above 70%.
What does this mean for you?
If anything, a robust public plan would add competition to many markets, competition that would, if anything, increase consumer and provider choice.

How exactly is that bad?


Mar
25

Coventry to be acquired by United HealthGroup?

Rumor is UHG is making a run at mid-tier managed care player Coventry Health. Forbes reported late today that Coventry’s share prices ticked up on the ‘news’.
I’m not surprised; as I noted several months ago Coventry is likely to be sold or dismembered this year. CEO Allen Wise has deep-rooted connections with UHG. Formerly an EVP at United, Wise was also a senior executive at MetraHealth and facilitated the acquisition of MetraHealth by UHG.
Coventry has been battered by news that it missed its medical loss projections a year ago, beginning a slide that continued with a major miss on Medicare numbers in the fall. Former CEO Allen Wise was brought in to assess the situation, a move that led to the dismissal of CEO Dale Wolf, a re-ordering of priorities, and renewed focus on the core small group HMO business (potentially at the expense of Medicare, Medicaid, Workers Comp, and National Account segments).
The deal wouldn’t be good news for providers; according to the Verden Group’s survey of physicians UHG is a mediocre performer in terms of policies, procedures, and reimbursement. Hospitals have a much more negative view of the huge plan, as UHG is considered the worst health plan to work with according to a survey by Davies.
If this comes to pass, there will be much more to consider. For now, it’s just a rumor.


Mar
1

How bad is the United Kingdom’s National Health Service?

A very good friend sent me this email after reading others’ comments about the Brits’ NHS. This gentleman has had numerous experiences with the American health care system, none due to lifestyle issues.
Here’s his story.
Five hours into an 11-hour flight to London last month I had a heart-related medical “incident” that caused me to faint, hitting my head on a trolley on the way down giving myself a concussion in addition to whatever else was ailing me. Although I (stupidly) refused the wheelchair and ambulance the airline had waiting for me at Heathrow, upon arrival at my hotel I was sent to the emergency room at St. Mary’s Hospital in London where I spent the next 24 hours.
I have to say that I received the BEST medical attention I have ever had or witnessed anywhere in the U.S. Upon arrival in the emergency room I was immediately seen by an administrator who did the necessary paperwork with a sense of urgency I’ve never seen in the U.S. I never even had a moment to take a seat. I was then admitted to the treatment area where for the next 3 hours I received a steady stream of nurses and – not one – but THREE doctors in rapid succession as checks and balances against each other. (At one point the three doctors convened and argued about my diagnosis just like the doctors on television who only have one patient to care about – and actually care.)
In addition to a battery of blood tests, temperature-takings and blood-pressure checks, I had THREE ECGs, TWO X-rays and a CAT-scan before being admitted for an overnight on a heart monitoring machine. After repeated attempts and many delays, they were finally able to get my cardiologist in L.A. on the phone to consult my records and get his opinion. The next day I continued a battery of tests all day long and was told they wanted to keep me for 3-4 days for monitoring and more tests. I refused and demanded to be released as I had to get to the business meetings I was there for – but promised to follow-up with my cardiologist when I returned to L.A. For the next ten days, I received phone calls every couple of days from one of the doctors who had seen me (not a nurse, a real DOCTOR) to make sure everything was alright and that I wasn’t experiencing symptoms.
The hospital was the cleanest I’ve ever seen, was stocked with the latest technology and the most attentive and empathetic staff I’ve ever seen. Had I been an EU resident, all of this treatment would have been free. As an American, I was allowed to walk out without a bill, but was later mailed a bill for — get this — $600. That’s right – six hundred dollars! ONE NIGHT in Cedars Sinai Hospital in Los Angeles – without any tests – starts at $15,000. The last time I paid for a CAT-scan it was about $1,800.
I am no stranger to hospitals in the U.S. I’ve had more than my share of emergencies and have been rushed twice by ambulance with life-threatening conditions only to be kept waiting on a gurney in a hallway for up to five hours. One unforgettable incident was being kept waiting five hours at St. Joseph’s Hospital in Santa Monica while my organs were in shut-down mode. The doctor later told me I was hours from death. Another time I was rushed unconscious while tumors had caused blockages of my large and small intestines. They wrongly thought I might have a ruptured appendix. While waiting five hours to be admitted, I was given an enema to try to clear the blockage. Had I had the ruptured appendix they suspected, this would have killed me.
I can only hope that the American health care system will become like the UK’s. Even the hospital food was good!
Oh – and by the way – when I got home and saw my cardiologist, he completely ridiculed and belittled the Brits for “over-reacting” and “throwing mud at the wall”. He explained that the reason they reacted as they did was because “they didn’t know what they were doing”. He offered the tests they recommended, but I’d have to wait 6-8 weeks to get on the docket at an outpatient facility and it was going to cost many thousands of dollars and he doubted my insurance would cover it. No thanks! I’m planning on getting the tests when I return to London next month.


Feb
9

Can government deliver quality health care?

The current debate in Washington has more than a few complaining about the expanding role of government in health care. The question should be, can government do a better job than private industry?
Heck yes.

I’ve never been one to buy into the ‘government can’t do anything right’ meme. Sure, government (which, incidentally, is run by people elected by us) can make mistakes – some pretty big ones at times. But it can also perform very well – NOAA, the CDC, the Coast Guard, Head Start, the NIH, the GI Bill, National Weather Service are a few examples.
But perhaps the best is the Veterans’ Administration and the health system run by the VA.
Here are a few factoids
– compared to commercial managed care plans, the VA provided diabetics with better quality care on seven out of eight metrics by NCQA.
– In 2005, VA hospitals were the highest-rated health system, outperforming other systems including the Mayo Clinic and Johns Hopkins.
– the VA achieves higher scores than private hospitals for patient satisfaction, staffing levels, surgical volume and other significant quality measures
– for six years running, VA hospitals scored higher than private facilities on the University of Michigan’s American Customer Satisfaction Index.
And costs haven’t increased nearly as fast as they have in the private sector. In the ten years ending in 2005, the number of veterans receiving treatment from the VA more than doubled, from 2.5 million to 5.3 million, but the agency needed 10,000 fewer employees to deliver that care – as a result the cost per patient stayed flat. (costs for care in the private sector jumped 60% over the same period).
The VA did this by closing down unneeded facilities, developing an industry-leading electronic health record system, opening clinics, and dramatically increasing the quality of care, especially for patients with chronic conditions.
Oh, and patients can access their own health records – securely – anytime on the web.
It wasn’t always like this; two decades ago the VA’s quality was suspect, to say the least. Yet this Federal government organization has been able to turn itself around from a mediocre outfit to one of, if not the, best health systems in the nation.
In his recent piece in the New Yorker, Atul Gawande offhandedly suggests the Feds open up the VA to anyone who wants to buy in.
Sign me up. I’d be only too happy to ditch the Golden Rule (in the running for most misnamed company…) insurance/HSA policy and head down 95 to the VA facility in West Haven, Conn.


Jan
30

Health plans in the hunt for acquisitions

The low share prices of health plans make for cheap deals – that’s the growing sense among the larger health plans, who see the current dip in values as a buying opportunity.
Among the big boys likely to be looking are Wellpoint, United, and HealthNet. While Cigna and Humana would love to be growing via acquisition, that’s not in the cards as they are struggling mightily. In particular, Cigna is in the midst of layoffs, an event that likely precludes any deals over the near term.
Wellpoint is among those looking to do deals. CEO Angela Braly was quoted recently saying “I even feel stronger about that [their ability to acquire health plans] in terms of the execution that we’ve really displayed over this past year…We really have a much more stable and efficient and effective claims operation, and we can bring that to new partners in an acquisition.”
UnitedHealthcare was built on acquisitions; the once-small midwest health plan grew by buying up other health plans in regional markets, later getting big enough to snap up giants including Pacificare. I expect United is already talking with Coventry CEO Allen Wise.
California-based Healthnet is the big health plan least likely to be looking for acquisitions. It has been hit hard by scandal and operational problems, and appears to be working on straightening out internal operations.
Aetna is a bit of a wild card. The most conservative of the big plans, it typically does not look to buy plans, but rather grows organically and through strategic acquisitions of companies with specific expertise in targeted markets. Lately that has meant Medicaid and specialty business. I don’t see that changing. That said, there may be some very good deals out there; low stock prices may cause even the staid ‘mother Aetna’ to open her pocketbook. In the end, the cautious nature of Aetna senior management will likely stop any deal before it goes too far. And who can blame them?; there’s a lot of damaged goods out there.
What does this mean for you?
The big will keep getting bigger.