I think I’ve figured out why analysts have been unable to accurately forecast health plan financials – they don’t know what questions to ask.
That’s the only conclusion I can draw after listening to the latest earnings call from Coventry Health. The mid-tier health plan company is still reeling a bit from last month’s announcement that it had been surprised by a sharp increase in medical costs, an increase that evidently had caught management by surprise.
Folks, this is a health plan company – one that claims “We deliver exceptional value every day, driving solutions that help people enjoy optimal health.”
One might think that a health plan company makes money by managing medical care for hundreds of thousands of Americans. Near as I can tell, Coventry isn’t a health plan, it is a transaction processor that makes money by pricing its insurance far enough above medical costs to administer the plans and make a bit of margin.
And from the questions that were asked ,and the ones that weren’t, it is pretty obvious Wall Street analysts think Coventry is a transaction processor as well. Out of the twenty or so questions after the management presentation, there was one – yes, one, that got anywhere close to actually inquiring about medical management. That questioner asked what Coventry could do or had done to deliver care to Medicare enrollees through an HMO at lower cost than thru the standard Medicare plan. Coventry Chairman Dale Wolf responded by noting that hospital days per 1000 members among Medicare HMO plans could be in teh 900-1300 range, compared to standard Medicare rates of around 3000 days/1000.
That was it. No follow up question as to how they could do that, what the long term implications were, how that affected pricing, what the techniques were that delivered such a great result and could those techniques be used for commercial members.
The entire conversation was about medical trend and how Coventry was fixing its pricing model to reflect higher trend, and if enrollment was going to decrease as a result. Not the factors causing medical trend and what Coventry was doing about it. Well, to be fair, there was a little dialogue about higher inpatient utilization and unit costs in Medicare, and higher hospital utilization on the commercial side. But if you were interested in Coventry’s solution to same, you’re out of luck. Not one analyst even asked.
If analysts don’t know to ask the company why their costs are going up and what they are going to do about it and how that will play out, what, exactly, are they ‘analyzing’?
There’s this thing in business called a sustainable competitive advantage – something you do really well, that is hard to do, that others don’t do well. This gives you an edge in the market, one that makes you a perennial winner. Coventry doesn’t have one, and neither do any of the other health plans. Because all they do is process transactions, adding no value.
Here are some of the questions they should have been asking.
- What key indicators of medical trend do you watch closely?
- Exactly what is your average inpatient days per thousand for each block of business and how does that compare to industry standards?
- How about admissions per thousand?
- what is driving trend? Is it unit cost (price per service), utilization (number of those services received by a member when they do get those services), frequency (percentage of members that get that service) or intensity (higher cost version of a technology or more expensive procedure type than expected)?
- Which types of medical care are the biggest drivers; ancillary, physician services, pharma, inpatient, outpatient?
- What is your plan to address those issues?
- How will you measure results and when will you know if you’ve been effective?
- What is Coventry doing about members with chronic conditions? How have your results compared to industry standards?
And the big one:
How would Coventry compete and win if it could not risk select and had to take all comers at a community rate?
Because that may well be the scenario Coventry, and all its competitors, face in two short years.
Note – this applies almost equally to most every health plan. In fact you could just about replace ‘Coventry’ with Wellpoint, Cigna, Humana, Blue Cross, etc and the same perspective would hold true.
Now I really am going on vacation.
Great post. Excellent questions.
Every large national health plan including Wellpoint, Aetna, UHG, and CIGNA do have a large-scale strategy (including acquistions and partnerships) in place in regarding medical management and are investing anywhere between $200-$500M to move forward with this because they have seen the possible writing on the wall.
Aetna is further along than the rest though because of their acquisition of ActiveHealth Management and a number of changes they have made including structure/storing of their data. This looks like it might already be paying some dividends since their recent medical loss ratio numbers were more impressive than their publically-traded brethen in the Q2.
Still, any payer faces some pretty steep hurdles to really drive improvements in medical management due to a couple of factors including the inherent limitations of the value of existing claims data (although specific lab values are valuable but any honest payer will tell you that driving improvements from claims data through analytic/BI tools results in very limited incremental improvement at best), figuring out how to incorporate the additional sources of data that health plans are gathering into medical management programs (e.g., HRAs), devoting limited resources to get the most bang for the buck (e.g., how many people with condition X can be handled by 6 case managers), and ways to successfully outreach to both patients and physicians.
Like it or not, health plans will play a critial role in improving (or not) because of their size and the amount of data they are sitting on. Rooting for them to fail as soon seem to hope is pretty foolish.
Great piece, Joe. I just riffed on it over at BNET Healthcare (URL below), coincidentally just before Bob Laszewski picked it up for HWR.
I still think it’s an open question as to how successful insurers can be with medical management — not only because they’re generally so bad at it, and because it’s very, very hard for a heretofore successful organization to change its entire way of doing business this way, but also because they’ve so tapped out any reservoir of trust and goodwill they might have once had. In other industries, you’d see entrepreneurial companies rise up to fill the void in a case like this, but I wonder if that’s even possible here.